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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF PROPERTY
BY WILLIS H. ELLIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The volume of business brought before the Colorado Supreme
Court is greater than that of most other state supreme courts, and
is increasing. Many of the comments made herein about particular
decisions are critical. The criticism should rightfully be directed,
as well, to the system that has left our supreme court the only ap-
pellate tribunal for almost all of the judicial determination made
throughout the entire state. The court simply does not have time
to do the job it should, and would like to do, with the cases that
come before it. Its function is too important to let it continue under
this burden. Serious consideration should be given to an intermedi-
ate appellate court that would let the supreme court fulfill its
greatest duty of deciding those important and difficult cases that
are not routine, by exercising a discretionary jurisdiction.
Only those cases that seem to add something new to the law
of property, or contain statements or holdings that the author con-
siders questionable are discussed herein.
II. TAX DEED
A. Virgin Title Doctrine
In 1938 U.S. Highway 6 was constructed around the town
of Silver Plume. Since the old road had been the main street of the
town, a connection between the main street and the new highway
was needed. Acquisition of the necessary land was entrusted to
an employee of the town. Apparently the employee failed to pur-
chase the land or a right-of-way across it, but the connecting road
was built just the same. Construction was done under an arrange-
ment between the town, the county and the state of Colorado.
For more than twenty years this connecting road was used
by the public without any suggestion that the town did not own
the right-of-way. In 1960 one of the plaintiffs attempted to block
the road. When the town refused to allow this, legal action resulted.
In Town of Silver Plume v. Hudson,1 the plaintiffs claimed
title under a tax deed from the county executed in 1945. The town
claimed a public highway by twenty years adverse use under a
1953 statute, applying specifically to public rights-of-way.
2
The trial court held that the public had not used the road ad-
versely the requisite twenty years because between 1938 and 1945
the County of Clear Creek held a tax certificate for the land in
question, and it was not until 1945 that the plaintiff took from the
county by treasurer's deed. There could be no adverse use against
the county because the county had cooperated in constructing the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Low.
1 380 P.2d 59 (Colo. 1963).
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 120-1-1 (1953). This section provides in pertinent part: "The following ore
hereby declared to be public highways: . . . . (3) All roads over private lands that have been
used adversely without interruption or objection on the part of the owners of such lands for twenty
consecutive years."
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highway. Adverse use began in 1945 when the plaintiffs took by
tax deed, and in 1960 sufficient time had not elapsed to create an
interest in the town.
The Supreme Court of Colorado rejected this reasoning. The
judgment was reversed on the basis of two holdings: (1) A tax
certificate (as distinguished from a tax deed) does not pass title,
and thus the county was never the owner of the land in question;3
and (2) the doctrine that a tax deed creates a new title unaffected
by defects in the previous chain does not apply to a public highway
obtained under the provisions of Colo. Rev. Stat. 120-1-1 (1953).
The virgin character of a valid tax deed was established early.4
An exception was recognized for mineral interests transferred prior
to the tax deed. 5 Now there is a new exception for public highways
obtained by adverse use. Because no reason is given for this new
exception, it is difficult to know whether other similar exceptions
can be expected in the future.
It is not difficult, however, to guess the reason for the Silver
Plume decision. It was a "hard case." The plaintiffs were attempt-
ing to block public access to a street that was the chief avenue into
town from the highway. Presumably the plaintiffs knew of the
street when they took the tax deed, and had no expectation of ac-
quiring the land free of this burden. The entire situation smacks
of opportunists discovering a "legal technicality" and trying to
use it to hold up the public as a windfall for themselves.
Although we may applaud the court for reaching the decision
it did, we nevertheless wish that guidelines had been drawn by
which to judge the future of the tax deed doctrine. The conclusion
that is drawn after the Silver Plume case is that tax deeds create
new titles unaffected by occurrences in the previous chain except
in hard cases, highways obtained under Colo. Rev. Stat. 120-1-1
(1953) and mineral right transfers. Of course the future may bring
120-1-1 cases in which there would be nothing shocking or hard
in applying the tax deed doctrine, but the court would now seem
stuck with the Silver Plume holding so far as 120-1-1 cases are
concerned.
One might wonder whether saving the town of Silver Plume
the expense of condemning a right-of-way was worth unsettling
the tax deed doctrine.
B. Effect Upon Boundary Dispute
There has been one other recent case concerning the doctrine
that tax deeds create a new title. Williams v. Wilk 6 was a contest
between two adjoining land owners. For some fifty years a building
had stood on defendant's land, with two pilasters supporting one
wall encroached on plaintiff's lot. Plaintiff sued to have the pilas-
ters removed. Defendant's answer was, of course, adverse possession
of the land upon which the pilasters had stood for over fifty years,
and the plaintiff's reply was that a tax deed in defendant's chain
3 Although the court cited no authority for this proposition, it seems to have been recognized
for some time in Colorado. Rach v. Fastenou, 122 Colo. 41, 219 P.2d 781 (1950); Morris v. St. Louis
Nat', Bank, 17 Colo. 231, 29 Pac. 802 (1892).
4 Jacobs v. Perry, 135 Colo. 550, 313 P.2d 1008 (1957); Harrison v. Everett, 135 Colo. 55,
308 P.2d 216 (1957); Henryln Irr. Dist. v. Patterson, 65 Colo. 385, 176 Poc. 493 (1918).
5 Mitchell v. Espinosa, 125 Colo. 267, 243 P.2d 412 (1952).
6 368 P.2d 558 (Colo. 1962).
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of title less than eighteen years before suit, wiped the slate clean
and destroyed the adverse possession upon which the defendant
relied. Presumably on the basis of this reply the trial court held
for the plaintiff and ordered the pilasters removed.
The reply was clearly inappropriate. The tax deed was in de-
fendant's chain of title while the land that defendant claimed by
adverse possession was in the plaintiff's chain of title. Therefore,
the tax deed that plaintiff claims wiped out the title by adverse
possession, did not describe the land adversely possessed. It gave a
"new" title in the land described, but certainly not in any other land.
This defect in the reply was demonstrated to the supreme court
by the defendants,7 but the court expressly refused to either accept
or reject the argument. Instead the court referred to the general
statute of limitations upon recovering the possession of real estate,
Colo. Rev. Stat. 118-7-1 (1953), and stated that this statute had run
and thus the plaintiff could not recover possession of the land upon
which the pilasters stood.
In effect this amounted to holding for the defendant on the basis
of its argument of adverse possession, and completely ignoring both
7 Id. at 560.
One thin dime
WILL BUY-
A cup of coffee ... a candy bar.., or, a pair of shoelaces.
A dime will also buy enough
NATURAL GAS to:
" dry 10 loads of wash in a clothes dryer
" operate your furnace for 5 hours on a cold night
" keep your water heater perking for 30 hours
" or, run your gas range for about 5 days.
SMALL WONDER WE SAY NATURAL GAS
IS STILL ONE OF YOUR BIGGEST BARGAINS
IN MODERN LIVING.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO
an investor-owned utility
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the defense and the reply to it.8 One could logically infer that the
court was rejecting the tax deed doctrine for all cases, since that
was the defense which the court chose to ignore. However, it seems
safe to say that the court intended no such implication.
III. TRUST DEED
Set-Off in "foreclosure proceeding"
Robinson and Riepen entered into an arrangement whereby
Riepen would operate Robinson's uranium mine. As a part of the
deal Riepen loaned Robinson $6,660.00, and took a promissory note
for that amount from Robinson. The note was to mature in five
years but would not be payable as long as the mining agreement
was still in full force and effect. As security for the note, Robinson
executed a trust deed on certain real estate.
Riepen apparently failed to carry out the mining operations
according to the contract, and shortly before the note matured he
permanently changed his domicile from Colorado to Arizona. When
Robinson defaulted on the note, Riepen asked the public trustee to
sell the real estate which he held as security. Two days before the
actual sale Robinson filed this rather unique law suit: Riepen v.
Robinson.9 In his complaint Robinson sought to enjoin the trustee's
sale, and to "set-off" his damages because of the alleged breach of
the mining agreement, against Riepen's recovery from the trustee's
sale. In fact Robinson claimed that his damages would amount to
more than his debt to Riepen, and asked that, therefore, the sale be
permanently enjoined and the trust deed canceled.
No injunction was issued, and the public sale was held on
schedule over the protests of Robinson. The property was purchased
by a third party for more than the amount owed. Robinson then
asked that his damages be adjudicated, and if found to exceed the
amount of the note held by Riepen, that the trustee's sale be set
aside. Service of process was made on Riepen by mail at his new
residence in Arizona. Riepen appeared specially and moved to quash
service. The trial court overruled the motion, upholding its juris-
diction, and Riepen brought an original action in the supreme court
under rule 106 asking the trial judge to show cause why motion to
quash should not be sustained.
Although there had been no personal service on Riepen in
Colorado, the supreme court discharged the rule to show cause,
without opinion, thereby upholding the trial court's jurisdiction. 10
The trial court's answer to the order to show cause argued that it
had jurisdiction without personal service in Colorado because the
8 To make the opinion even mare confusing, the court said that it did not have to decide
,,pon the defense of adverse possession either:
Though there may be merit to defendant's argument as to the nonapplicability of Harrison
[case holding that tax deed gives a new title] it is unnecessary to consider either it or the
defense of adverse possession, because their defense is clearly substantiated by CRS '53
118-7-I. ...
Williams v. Wills, 368 P.2d 558, 560.
The statute relied upon by the court is one of the principal statutes defining adverse possession
in Colorado. If the plaintiff's suit was barred by this statute, it must follow that the defend-
ant had obtained title by adverse possession.
At least one modern writer has argued that in boundary disputes the doctrine of adverse
possession should be treated as nothing more than a statute of limitation upon suits to recover
the possession of real esate, thus eliminating such problems as the character of the possession, etc.
It seems too much to hope that the court had this development in mind in writing this opinion.
See Callahan, Adverse Possession (1961).
9 372 P.2d 456 (Colo. 1962).
10 Riepen v. District Court of Larimer County, Colo. Supreme Court Docket No. 19583, (1960).
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proceeding was in rem and asked for a set-off in the trustee's sale,
which was analogized to a mortgage foreclosure. The fact that the
trustee's sale was not a judicial proceeding at all did not seem to
deter the court from accepting the argument.1 At this point the
plaintiff's theory of set-off was the same theory which the court
later held could not be brought in a mortgage foreclosure (or
analogous proceeding).
Its jurisdiction over the complaint having been affirmed by the
supreme court, the trial court proceeded to try the substantive
issues. It found that Riepen had in fact breached the mining agree-
ment, and that Robinson's damages did exceed the amount of Robin-
son's debt to Riepen. It, therefore, ordered the trustee's sale set
aside and the note canceled. The supreme court then reversed this
judgment on the basis of the general rule that a set-off will be
allowed in a mortgage foreclosure only if the amount of the set-off
is liquidated' 2 It was apparently admitted by all parties that the
Robinson claim was unliquidated.
Counter actions are generally divided into set-off and recoup-
ment. "Set-off" is the term used to describe claims (often restricted
to contract) that do not arise out of the same transaction that gave
rise to the principal action. Since a set-off will require a trial of
issues extraneous to the principal action, it is generally limited to
liquidated claims.' "Recoupment" is the term used for claims that
do arise out of the same transactions as the principal claim, and
since the issues tried are all connected, recoupment is usually al-
lowed for unliquidated as well as liquidated claims.14 Robinson's
contract claim in this case arose out of the same transaction that
gave rise to the note and trust deed. If the court had treated the
claim as a recoupment, it might have been able to view the matter
differently.
Indeed, if we accept the court's own statement that it reversed
the trial court because Robinson's claim was unliquidated, we have
a rather surprising example of judicial administration. The question
of jurisdiction was before the supreme court, before the trial, in the
original proceeding under rule 106. In affirming the trial court's
decision overruling the motion to quash, the court must have been
sustaining jurisdiction on some basis. The Robinson claim was un-
11 The holding, although unsupported by reasons, has interesting implications. On the basis of
the result reached one could argue that a trustee's sale in Colorado which is not a judicial proceeding
will nevertheless support ancillary jurisdiction.
12 The court cited, 37 Am. Jur. Mortgages § 728, 1941, in support of the general rule. Actually, the
rule applies to set-offs in general and not just set-offs in a foreclosure proceeding.
13 City of Grand Rapids, Mich. v. McCurdy, 136, F.2d 615 (6th Cir. 1943); Pennsylvania R.R.
v. Miller, 124 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1941); Francisco v. Francisco, 120 Mont. 468, 191 P.2d 317 (1948);
Stern v. Sunset Road Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 334, 190 Poc. 651 (1920); Lysle Milling Co. v. North
Alabama Grocery Co., 201 Ala. 222, 77 So. 748 (1918).
14 Crossett Lumber Co. v. United States, 87 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1937); Curtis.Warner Corp. v.
Thirkette, 99 N.J. Eq. 806, 134 Atl. 299 (1926); Alley v. Bessemer Gas Engine Co., 228 S.W. 963 (Tex.
1921); Lysle Milling Co. v. North Alabama Grocery Co., 201 Ala. 222, 77 So. 748 (1918). See the
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liquidated at this point, and if it could not be brought as a set-off
and properly attached to the "foreclosure" proceedings, this would
have destroyed the court's jurisdiction then and there. After the
substantive issue of breach of contract was tried Robinson's dam-
ages were no longer unliquidated. They had been judicially found
to exceed the amount of the secured note. After the primary reason
for not allowing an unliquidated set-off (the trying of extraneous
issues in an unliquidated claim) had been obviated by actually con-
ducting the trial, and after the damages were no longer unliqui-
dated, the court decided the whole thing had been a mistake and
held that since it shouldn't have been done in the first place it would
have to be undone now.
This kind of jurisdiction is subject to some degree of judicial
discretion, and one would think that after the issues had been fully
tried with the blessing of the supreme court, that discretion would
be exercised in favor of the alleged set-off. Especially since courts
have often exercised their discretion in favor of a true set-off on the
sole ground that the person against whom the set-off was brought
could not otherwise be sued in the jurisdiction. 15 This was, of course,
such a case.
When we bring the various threads of this case together we find
that there was questionable jurisdiction to begin with since there
was no judicial proceeding to support the "set-off," and the require-
ments of rule 102 had not been complied with.16 Jurisdiction having
been asserted, the suit was finally not allowed because of the general
rule that a set-off must be of a liquidated amount. The entire chain
of events is distressing since this was not properly a set-off but a
recoupment which can be allowed for unliquidated damages (except
that there were no action here to attach it to). But in addition, the
damages were liquidated at the time of the supreme court's decision.
However, the propriety of a set-off or counter-claim was not the
primary issue presented by the situation. The plaintiff was seeking
to set aside the trustee's sale not merely to try a counter-claim with
it. Thus, the difficult question of the protection to be accorded the
reliance of purchasers at a tax sale was potentially involved. The
decision to set a trustee's sale aside would seem to require stronger
provocation than the decision to try a counter-claim with it.
The court properly pointed out that if the plaintiff's suit was
not even a proper set-off it was certainly not grounds for setting
the sale aside.' 7 But since the statement about a proper set-off is at
least questionable, perhaps the issue of setting the tax sale aside
could have been profitably discussed.
IV. DESCRIPTION IN DEED
Result of Erroneous Federal Survey
The court reached a puzzling result in Ashley v. Hill,is assum-
ing that all the operative facts are set out in the opinion.
15 Heller & Co. v. Lindsay, 146 Colo. 452, 361 P.2d 979 (1961); Plattner Implement Co. v.
Bradley Alderson & Co., 40 Colo. 95, 90 Pac. 86 (1907). This argument was made to the court
for the first time in the petition for rehearing. Record, vol. 2, p. 1, Plaintiff's petition for rehearing,
Riepen v. Robinson, 372 P.2d 456 (Colo. 1962).
16 The plaintiff might have viewed the defendant's interest in the trustee's sole as property
and attached such interest under rule 102 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure. If the plaintiff
had complied with the requirements of rule 102, jurisdiction in rem could have been acquired.
17 375 P.2d 337 (Coo. 1962).
18 Ibid.
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In 1883 a federal survey and plat were completed. In 1887 a
federal patent was issued to the plaintiff's ultimate predecessor in
title. The description was taken from the 1883 survey and included a
certain millsite. In 1904 a federal patent was issued to the defend-
ant's ultimate predecessor in title, and presumably the description
was also taken from the 1883 survey since there was no other survey
in existence at that time. In 1927 a new federal survey was made
showing that the survey of 1883 was incorrect. Using the correct
1927 survey the millsite was not on land described in the patent
taken by plaintiff's predecessor, but rather on land described in the
patent granted to the defendant's predecessor.
Apparently subsequent deeds in both plaintiff's and defendant's
chains of title simply copy the descriptions found in previous deeds,
even after the new survey of 1927. Thus, in 1960 the situation was
that plaintiff had record title to land which according to the 1883
survey included the millsite, and which under the 1927 survey did
not include the millsite. Defendant had record title to land which
under the 1927 survey included the millsite and which under the
1883 survey did not. It is admitted that the 1927 survey is correct.
Both parties ask that their alleged interest in the millsite be quieted.
The trial court found for the defendant.
In affirming judgment for the defendant the supreme court
made its decision a foregone conclusion by the way in which it put
the issue before it:
The question for determination is whether a land re-
survey which established that an error was made in the
legal description of the millsite in a United States patent
which was issued under an earlier survey, worked an ouster
of a subsequent patentee and his successors in interest of
that portion of real property conveyed by a later patent
which is embraced within the corrected description of the
millsite.11"
By asking whether anything occurred to oust the defendant
rather than asking whether anything happened to oust the plaintiff,
the court seems to have started with the assumption that the de-
fendant has a better right. The opinion does not indicate who, if
anyone, was in possession of the millsite, and possession was not
made an issue in the case.
On the basis of the facts recited in the opinion it seems that
both of the original patents were based upon the 1883 survey, which
was the only one in existence at that time. Thus, the intent of
grantor and grantee in both cases can only be determined by look-
ing at the 1883 survey.
Whether this survey was correct or not, it was the survey the
original parties looked at to determine how to describe the land
they intended to convey. It seems clear, then, that the patent
granted to the plaintiff's predecessor was intended to describe land
containing the millsite. It is difficult to know how that land ever
got into the defendant's chain of title. If the decision is not a mis-
carriage of justice, the justification for it does not appear in the
opinion.
The case would seem to stand for the proposition that the
19 Ibid.
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description in a deed means what the latest (and presumably cor-
rect) survey says it means rather than what the parties thought it
meant at the time they executed the deed. We trust, however,
that the case will not be successfully cited in support of such a
proposition.
V. CHATTEL MORTGAGE
Interest of Mortgagee in the Property Mortgaged
The defendant purchased an automobile and gave a note and
chattel mortgage which were purchased by plaintiff. Defendant
defaulted on the note, was granted a discharge in voluntary bank-
ruptcy proceedings, and then lost the automobile in an inaccessible
canyon in Utah. Although the loss of the automobile was not due to
defendant's negligence, the chattel mortgage recited that defendant
would not take the vehicle out of Colorado without he mortgagee's
permission. Defendant did not obtain such permission. The plaintiff
was granted permission to sell the automobile to pay the amount
of the note, but with the virtual destruction of the car (apparently
without adequate insurance coverage), the plaintiff was trying to
hold the defendant liable for the value of the car despite the dis-
charge. The court, in Finance Corp. v. King,20 held that the note was
discharged in the bankruptcy proceedings, and that the defendant





The decedent widow had eleven children. She deeded the family
ranch to one of the children shortly before she died. This grantee
was the only child still living at home at the time. The other chil-
dren sought to set the deed aside on the grounds that the grantee
exercised undue influence on their mother at a time when she was
ill and unable to form the necessary intent to transfer the land.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and the supreme court
20370 P.2d 432 (Colo. 1962).
21 The arguments of plaintiff, which were rejected by the court, were: (1) The defendant is a
trustee for the plaintiff because he took the car out of Colorado in violation of the chattel mortgage;
(2) That the defendant having defaulted prior to the bankruptcy proceeding, title to the car vested
in plaintiff, subject only to defendant's right of redemption, and defendant therefore held car as
trustee for plaintiff; (3) Even though obligation on the note was discharged, in the bankruptcy
proceeding, the defendant was still liable for the security either by returning it to plaintiff or
paying its value.
KELLY GIRLS * Skilled * Tested * Bonded
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affirmed.2 2 The supreme court held that the fact that defendant had
possession of the deed was prima facie evidence of delivery, putting
the burden of proving nondelivery upon the plaintiffs.
2 3
Plaintiffs tried to rely upon the general rule that " . . . Where
a fiduciary relationship is shown to exist between parties to a trans-
action and the fiduciary is enriched thereby, the law presumes that
the transaction was produced as a result of undue influence on the
part of the fiduciary .... .. 4 The supreme court held that no
fiduciary relationship exists between mother and son under normal
circumstances, as here. The plaintiffs were unable to produce evi-
dence of lack of competence in their mother.
VII. RESTRICTIVE COVENANT SPECIFICALLY ENFORCED
In Smith v Nelson,2 the court affirmed.a judgment specifically
enforcing a restrictive covenant in defendant's chain of title. The
suit was successfully brought by neighbors whose property was
subject to similar covenants. The restrictions concerned the distance
of buildings from front and side lot lines; the number of residences
per lot; the cost of buildings and square feet contained within each
building. The court rejected defenses of waiver and laches because
the plaintiffs had complained to the defendant as soon as they
learned of his building plans, and because suit was filed promptly.
VIII. TORT
Duty of Property Owner re Condition of Street Adjoining
Owner's Land
A motion for summary judgment was granted and affirmed in
Ellsworth v. Colorado Beverage Co. 2 6 The plaintiff claimed dam-
ages for personal injuries allegedly suffered when he slipped on
the icy street immediately adjacent to a building owned and oc-
cupied by defendants. There was no sidewalk between the street
and defendants' building, and defendants' customers parked on this
portion of the street. Plaintiff was a business invitee of the de-
fendants, and was injured while getting out of his car which was
parked on the street adjacent to defendants' building. Plaintiff did
not claim that defendants had caused ice to be on the street, but
rather that they had failed to remove it or warn business invitees
of it.
The court distinguished the case from Sill v. Lewis,2 7 in which
the property owner's premises were so constructed as to discharge
water upon the street where it froze, and the injured plaintiff was
allowed to recover.
IX. EMINENT DOMAIN
It has long been held that one whose property is cut off from
a reasonable access by the vacation or barricading of a street is
22White v. White, 368 P.2d 417 (Colo. 1962). Also discussed in Yegge, One Year Review of
Civil Procedure and Appeals, 40 Denver L.C.J. 66, 86 (1963), and Cantwell, One Year Review of
Wills, Estates and Trusts, 40 Denver L.C.J. 122, 124 (1963).
23This portion of the holding was based directly upon Colo. Rev. Stat. 118-6-1(4) (1953).
24 368 P.2d 417, 419, citing Lesser v. Lesser, 128 Colo. 151, 250 P.2d 130 (1952), and Hilliard
v. Shellabarger, 120 Colo. 441, 210 P.2d 441 (1949).
25 368 P.2d 556 (Colo. 1962).
26 370 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1952).
27 140 Colo. 436, 344 P.2d 972 (1959).
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entitled to compensation. The courts have experienced difficulty
when only one of two or more means of access is blocked. It has
generally been held that the property owner who is left in a cul de
sac by the closing of one end of his sole avenue of access is entitled
to such damages as he can prove.
28
In Colorado a property_ owner was allowed to recover from a
private corporation which constructed railroad track and facilities
that blocked his principal and only convenient access to the down-
town area.2 9 The fact that plaintiff could get into his property did
not prevent his recovery.
This area has been developed further in a recent case. In
Gayton v. Department of Highways,30 the supreme court affirmed
the dismissal of a complaint which alleged that the only access to
plaintiff's property was an alley and that one of the two ends of the
alley had been permanently blocked by the defendant. The com-
plaint failed to allege facts which would show special as opposed to
general damages. Special damages are damages greater than those
accruing to the community in general from the change.
The difference between the facts in Gayton and the first Colo-
rado case mentioned,31 where recovery was allowed, is the difference
between blocking one of two equally convenient access routes, and
blocking the only convenient route. The plaintiff, in Colorado, must
plead and prove injury amounting to more than a reduction of the
number of reasonably convenient means of access. He must show
a detrimental change in the kind of access, to the point at which
the court will say that his access has been made unreasonably diffi-
cult. And if he does not plead this he is subject to a motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a cause of action.
X. ZONING
In the area of zoning the court reaffirmed its position in several
cases that zoning is an administrative function, and that the courts
will review the zoning agency's determinations only for abuse of
discretion. Board of County Comm'rs v. Shaffer -3 2 and Denver v.
American Oil Co.3 3 were discussed in this year's review of constitu-
tional law.
3 4
In one other case, however, the court held that the district
court in reviewing a determination of the Zoning Commission could
hear new evidence that had not been before the Commission, on the
question of whether the plaintiff's constitutional rights had been
violated by the zoning regulation as applied to him. In Morris v.
Board of County Comm'rs,35 the plaintiff claimed that the Jefferson
County Planning Commission had approved his plan, but that the
county commissioners had denied it. Plaintiff claimed to be deprived
of his constitutional rights in that the zoning regulations placed
28 For collected cases see Annot. 93 A.L.R. 639 (1934) supplementing 49 A.L.R. 330 (1927).
29 Denver Union Terminal Ry. v. Glodt, 67 Colo. 155, 186 Pac. 904 (1920).
30367 P.2d 899 (1962). The procedural aspects of the dismissal of the complaint in this case
are discussed in Yegge, One Year Review of Civil Procedure and Appeals, 40 Denver L.C.J. 66, 74
(1963).
31 Supra note 29 and accompanying text.
32 367 P.2d 751 (Colo. 1962).
33 374 P.2d 357 (Colo. 1962). To the same effect is Levy v. Board of Adjustment of Arapahoe
County, 369 P.2d 991 (Colo. 1962).
34 Gitelman, One Year Review of Constitutional Low, 40 Denver L.C.J. 134, 151 (1963).
35 370 P.2d 438 (Colo. 1962).
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upon his land deprived him of the only reasonable use to which
it could be put.
The plaintiffs filed the action in the District Court of Jefferson
County to review the action of the county commissioners and to
seek a declaratory judgment stating their right to construct the
facilities under question. Plaintiffs sought to introduce evidence
which had not been before the county commissioners and the dis-
trict court refused to hear it. The supreme court, in reversing, held
that the new evidence should have been heard in connection with
th request for a declaratory judgment.
Judicial review of an administrative zoning decision apparently
goes beyond looking for an abuse of the discretion of the zoning
authority on the basis of the record before it, where a constitutional
claim is made. The claim that a zoning decision denies all reason-
able use of certain land is treated as a constitutional claim, and it
seems inevitable that the courts should have the last word on what
use is reasonable. It is to be hoped, however, that the good start
the court has made in leaving zoning to the agencies that have the
technical competence and continuing interest in it, will be continued
and that only a clear denial of constitutional rights will justify a
judicial reversal of the administrative determination.
One question has apparently been ignored in the Morris opin-
ion. The case was remanded to the district court to hear additional
evidence on a constitutional question which boils down to a question
of fact that is clearly within the zoning authority's competence, i.e.
can the plaintiff put his land to any reasonable use other than the
forbidden use?
When the constitutional quesiton is based upon a determination
of facts not within the agency's competence-e.g. the constitution-
ality of the statute creating the agency and giving it its powers-
there may be good reason for not letting the agency make the
initial decision. But when the question, as here, is one within its
competence, the agency should hear the evidence and make the
first determination. Specifically in the Morris case the county com-
missioners should be allowed to make their decision on whether the
plaintiffs can make more than one reasonable use of this land. If
there is new evidence on this question, the case should be remanded
to the commissioners rather than to the district court.
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